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Abstract—As adoption of smartphones and tablets increases,
and budget device offerings become increasingly affordable,
the vision of bringing universal connectivity to the developing
world is becoming more and more viable. Nonetheless, it is
important to consider the diverse use-cases for smartphones and
tablets today, particularly where a user may only have access
to a single connected device. In many regions, banking and
other important services can be accessed from mobile connected
devices, expanding the reach of these services.
This paper highlights the practical risks of one such low-
cost computing device, highlighting the ease with which a very
recent (manufactured September 2015) Android-based internet
tablet, designed for the developing world, can be completely
compromised by an attacker. The weaknesses identified allow
an attacker to gain full root access and persistent malicious
code execution capabilities. We consider the implications of these
attacks, and the ease with which these attacks may be carried
out, and highlight the difficulty in effectively mitigating these
weaknesses as a user, even on a recently manufactured device.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The smartphone and tablet markets in developing regions
are predicted to see significant growth in the coming years.
Time magazine reported on the current low market penetration
of smartphones in India, and the likelihood for rapid growth
in sales of lower price-point handsets [1]. Cisco’s Visual
Networking Index predicts that by 2019, mobile data traffic
usage in India will grow 13-fold from 2014, and that 51% of
devices will be smart devices (i.e. smartphones and tablets)
rather than feature-phones [2].
In Africa, there has been a widely documented rise in
the use of mobile phones by individuals, as both a means
of communication, as well as a means of access to services
from governments and banks [3][4, pp. 80-90]. The rise of
mobile banking in Africa is also especially significant, as it has
reached significant market penetration and day-to-day usage,
with mobile payments in Africa exceeding those from both
Europe and North America [5], [6].
There is therefore a motivation for technology-based at-
tacks against users in these regions, leading towards crimes
such as theft. This paper aims to explore some of the risks
posed by consumer electronic devices targeted specifically
towards developing markets. We highlight the risks posed
to users as a result of some of the security weaknesses in
these devices, and consider the challenges of providing secure
computing environments in these situations.
Conventionally in the study of security, attacks involving
compromise of a local device are generally neglected, on
account of the adage that physical access to a device grants
the attacker control over the device. Despite this, the threat
model for consumer hardware is rapidly evolving, with Secure
Boot in UEFI on desktop and laptop computers able to protect
against malicious modifications to the computer’s operating
system during offline attack [7]. For this reason, we consider
physical attacks from non-invasive attacks (i.e. not requiring
physical disassembly of the product) to be highly relevant and
significant to users of these devices, and shall illustrate the
significance of these attacks in Section IV.
II. OVERVIEW OF ANDROID SECURITY MODEL
The Android operating system is derived from an open
source project, referred to as the Android Open Source Project
(AOSP) [8]. Android is a customised userland, built on top of
the Linux kernel, providing APIs for sandboxed applications to
run, and access hardware in a standardised manner, irrespective
of the manufacturer of the device. This means that many
devices run the Android operating system, from different
manufacturers, and application software may run on any of
these, using the Android platform’s hardware abstraction to
simplify the development of software.
Android devices, in contrast to more general purpose
Linux-based computers, are designed around a security model
whereby each user application runs within a separate Unix user
account (UID). By controlling access to protected resources
through a combination of a permissions layer provided by the
Android APIs, and regular filesystem permissions, applications
are sandboxed from each other, and are not normally able to
access data from other applications.
This isolation offers a different security model from the
desktop. The Android model assumes that an application may
safely store data privately within its own dedicated area,
protected by the filesystem access control permissions. This
prevents other applications, or indeed the user themselves,
from having direct access to these files.
Android devices, in common with most Linux-based em-
bedded systems, feature a number of separate partitions, in
order to separately hold the kernel image, ramdisk, and main
operating system. There is additionally a partition to hold the
user’s data, which is able to be erased in the process of carrying
out a factory reset. Ordinarily, no partition other than the user
data partition should be mounted read-write — the operating
system partition is, by default, mounted read-only, and other
partitions are not generally mounted, since they do not contain
regular filesystems.
In line with other Unix-based systems, root access is the
highest level of privilege available to code running under the
kernel. Code executed as the root user may load modules into
the kernel, altering its behaviour, and generally access any
resource provided by the kernel, with full access permissions.
A. Main Requirements
The Android compatibility definition document, as pub-
lished by Google [9], is intended as a guide as to good practice
when making a device which runs on the Android operating
system. In order to receive approval for the shipping of Google
services on a device (which we note the device investigated in
this paper did not include), it is necessary for these guidelines
to be followed.
On Android devices, the root user account is not meant
for normal use, and there is not meant to be a means for the
end user (or applications) to access it [9]. This is because the
root user is inherently able to access the entire filesystem, thus
bypassing the access controls of the Android security model,
and this would expose protected application data to any code
running as root.
Additionally, Android now requires the use of SELinux in
enforcing mode [9]. SELinux is a mandatory access control
framework, designed to enforce system-wide security policies
across a system. It is capable of constraining applications
which run as the root user, and therefore offers some protection
against the use of kernel root exploits and other privilege
escalation attacks, since such an exploit will not bypass the
constraints of the SELinux policies [10]. This naturally re-
quires well-designed and implemented policies, since SELinux
merely enforces those policies.
III. OVERVIEW OF PLATFORM HARDWARE
While the Android operating system is shipped on a wide
variety of devices, at a wide variety of price points, we focus
exclusively on low-cost, consumer hardware. The tablet in
question we investigated was manufactured in September 2015,
according to the information label on the box, and shipped
with Android 4.4 (KitKat), and retailed for 3499 Rupees
in India [11] (approximately 50 USD). It was distributed
to attendees of meeting 35 of the Wireless World Research
Forum, as a conference gift holding the proceedings.
Android devices feature a bootloader, which initialises
the hardware, loads the kernel from storage into memory,
and executes the kernel, having set the kernel commandline
parameters to specify where to locate the remainder of the
operating system.
In addition to loading the kernel, the bootloader is also
used to control boot modes, based upon the boot control
block, which is implemented to allow a device to boot into
a minimal recovery environment. This environment does not
require the Android userland to be present to run, and ships
with its own kernel image and ramdisk, from which the main
operating system and kernel can be updated. This environment
also carries out factory reset operations, erasing the user data
partition. The bootloader also typically offers a means of
reprogramming a device’s internal memory, to allow for the
recovery image to be upgraded, and to allow the device to be
programmed as part of the manufacturing process.
IV. VULNERABILITY IDENTIFICATION
In this section, the process through which vulnerabilities
were identified on the device is discussed, as well as the
capabilities of each exploit. These vulnerabilities are reported
in the order they were originally identified during our research.
Finally, following our exploration of these identified issues, we
carried out a security scan of the underlying Android operating
system (since our identified vulnerabilities mostly lie below the
Android operating system), and highlight the risks identified
there.
A. Root ADB Access by Default
Initial exploration of the device indicated that ADB (An-
droid Debugging Bridge) was enabled by default, which is a
property of engineering and userdebug builds (referred to as
“eng” or “userdebug” builds) of Android. These builds feature
reduced security, compared with release firmware (referred
to as “user” builds). This was confirmed by carrying out a
factory reset of the device, and verifying that ADB remained
enabled by default. The build fingerprint was also checked
using getprop ro.build.type, indicating the build was
a “userdebug” build.
One of the relevant security features disabled in “eng”
builds is ADB host verification, which requires the user accept
a public key presented by the computer opening a connection
with the ADB daemon on the phone. This meant that it was
possible for an ADB session to be established without either a
prompt being shown to the user, or confirmation being given
by the user.
The ADB connection available over USB offered a standard
Unix shell on the device, from which commands may be
executed by any device connected to the USB port. One of the
binaries available on the device was the su binary, designed
to escalate the current user to root. On this device, it was
possible to carry out an escalation from the ADB shell user,
to the root user, without any prompt of input. This escalation
to root access was confirmed using the Unix id command,
indicating the shell was running as UID 0, that of the root
user.
It was not possible for user applications to carry out a root
escalation using this approach directly, since root access was
only granted to the shell user. Nonetheless, this poses a risk
for users charging or otherwise plugging their device into an
untrusted charger, or where others may have even momentary
physical access to the device. In many developing countries,
where access to grid-supplied electricity is not practical, users
charge devices in shops or public charging stations [12],
putting them at risk of a rogue charger connecting over ADB
and gaining root access to the device.
B. SELinux Bypass
Although root access was obtained from the ADB shell,
this access was still potentially subject to SELinux policy
constraints. While no denials were encountered in the process
of carrying out this work, it was found to be possible to
easily disable SELinux. SELinux was firstly ascertained to
be enabled through the use of the getenforce command,
which indicated the policies were in “Enforcing” mode (rather
than merely in permissive fault logging mode). By running
the command setenforce 0 from the rooted shell, it was
possible to disable the SELinux access controls, as verified by
the “Permissive” response from the getenforce command.
C. Bootloader Root Shell
Access to the device bootloader was gained by holding
down both the volume down, and power buttons, to turn on
the device. In this mode, the device presented a menu of
options, selectable using the volume keys and power button. In
bootloader mode, an ADB device was again presented over the
USB interface, once again without ADB authentication. Once
again, upon opening the shell, it was possible to escalate to root
access using the su command using the shell. The presence
of this vulnerability in the bootloader means that even in the
event of the regular firmware being patched or upgraded, it
would also be necessary to make significant modifications to
the lower level boot stack, which may or may not be practical
to carry out, given the risks of carrying out an upgrade of
device bootloaders in-the-field.
While accessing this shell, it was observed that the user
data and operating system filesystems were both mounted in
read-write mode. This meant that it was possible to easily
make persistent modifications to the operating system image,
or access user data, directly from the bootloader shell.
We also observed that the bootloader installed on the device
to the partition mmcblk0boot0 did not feature a crypto-
graphic signature at its footer, indicating it is likely that this
bootloader is unsigned, and therefore potentially vulnerable to
tampering or modification by a suitably determined adversary.
D. Recovery ZIP Signing Keys
The recovery environment, used to install operating system
updates, has the capability for a ZIP file containing new
firmware to be loaded into memory and installed. This ZIP
file should be signed with a private key corresponding to a
certificate stored on the device itself, in order to verify that the
firmware being installed has not been modified or corrupted
in the process of reaching the device.
This signature check relies upon the confidentiality of the
firmware zip signing keys — if a third party is able to generate
signed firmware images, they may replace any component of
the device operating system, including installed applications or
even the device kernel, simply through creation of a custom
firmware ZIP file. In the case of this device, the recovery
image accepted standard ZIP signing keys, which are publicly
available within the AOSP source code repositories [13]. As
a proof of concept, a ZIP was created to display a message
to the screen, and add a new file to the device filesystem. It
was then signed using the AOSP testkey, and successfully
installed onto the device, using the “Install from ADB” feature
of the recovery environment.
The file input.zip was signed using the command
java -jar signapk.jar -w testkey.x509.pem
testkey.pk8 input.zip output-signed.zip,
and installed using the command adb sideload
output-signed.zip
The execution of the ZIP file was confirmed through the
output of the command to display a message to the screen, and
the new file added to the filesystem being observed following
a reboot. This illustrated it was possible to make arbitrary
modifications to the device operating system, such as adding
new files, or modifying existing files, which would not be
reverted following a device factory reset.
E. Application Package Signing Keys
Android applications (APKs) are signed in a similar man-
ner to ZIP firmware upgrades. To prevent application replace-
ment attacks, where a user is encouraged or coerced into
installing a false update to an application, the Android platform
will not allow an update to an application to be installed if its
signing key does not match the existing signing key for the
application. This ensures that the party signing the APK holds
the same key as originally used by the developer. Likewise,
applications are protected against downgrading, by ensuring
that the version code has been incremented since the previous
update, which could be used to install an old version of an
application with vulnerabilities, for exploitation.
The signing keys used for the platform applications (which
have privileged access to system APIs) were found to, again, be
the default AOSP signing keys, which are publicly available. It
was therefore possible to replace core system applications on
the device, including for example, the dialer, settings interface,
keyboard, and overall firmware user interface (referred to as
SystemUI).
A modified version of these applications could then be used
to upgrade an existing version of the application, without the
user being made aware of any extra risks. This is of particular
significance since platform level applications have full access
to the entire device and permissions. Having a publicly avail-
able platform key significantly violates the Android security
model, which assumes the platform key is not available to
attackers [14].
F. Android OS Security Status
To conclude our analysis of the device, we carried out an
analysis of the device’s resistance to a variety of standard,
well-known attacks and exploits against the Android operating
system, using the Bluebox’s “Trustable” security scanner [15].
The results of this highlighted that the device was protected
against only 3 of the 12 vulnerabilities scanned for. This scan-
ner was selected, as it is capable of detecting all of the recent
high-profile security vulnerabilities of the Android operating
system, including “StageFright”, the multiple variants of the
Fig. 1: Result of Bluebox security scan for Android vulnera-
bilties
Fig. 2: Successful execution of local root exploit CVE-2015-
3036
“MasterKey” attack, and a number of kernel root exploits,
including the futex attack. Figure 1 highlights the results of
this scan. We also note that the device was vulnerable to the
CVE-2015-3636 local privilege escalation attack via kernel
ping sockets. An open source implementation of this exploit
is available [16], and was used to verify that the device was
vulnerable. Any application capable of executing a binary on
this device (or indeed a user with access to a shell) was able
to gain local root access, as shown in Figure 2, where a shell
running as the root user was obtained.
Of these vulnerabilities, FakeID, Futex, ObjectInputStream
and PendingIntent were reported in 2014, yet remained un-
patched in this device, with a manufacture date of September
2015. This was due, in part, to some of these fixes being
withheld until the release of future major versions of Android,
rather than immediate security patches being released and
backported to older software versions. While Google has begun
to issue security backport patches and notifications [17], this
is a very recent change, and requires the vendor to apply these
patches. In the case of this device, the presence of serious
weaknesses like the futex root exploit, suggest this is not the
case, and that patches are not being applied prior to the launch
of devices.
Indeed, by checking the build date of the software on
the device from the command getprop ro.build.date,
the software was found to have been built in April 2015,
several months before the product’s release date. The software
therefore appeared to not have been rebuilt by the manufacturer
in the 5 months prior to launch, thus explaining the lack of
many security patches. Since the device in question had no
over-the-air update capabilities, we suggest a device shipping
with 5 months’ of disclosed vulnerabilities present puts users
at risk from the moment the device is removed from its box.
G. Summary of Attack Vectors
A number of vulnerabilities have been identified on this
device. All of these were in the default configuration, in an out-
of-box setup as experienced by users. They are listed below
in summary form.
• Privilege escalation to root possible from ADB shell
on device
• ADB shell accessible without authentication, enabled
by default
• SELinux can be disabled via a root shell
• ADB shell allowing privilege escalation to root avail-
able in bootloader
• Recovery image uses well-known signing keys in-
tended only for testing
• Platform applications are signed using well-known
signing keys intended only for testing
• Multiple previously disclosed vulnerabilities, includ-
ing root exploits, unpatched on released device.
V. POTENTIAL ATTACKS
This section shall consider some of the potential attacks
which could be carried out against users, as a result of the
attack vectors described previously. These attacks should be
considered in the context of a user in the developing world,
who may be using this device for a variety of tasks, includ-
ing banking or accessing government services, as discussed
previously.
Previous works have examined user attitudes towards the
perceived sensitivity and value of personal data on smart-
phones, and what concerned them most about potential actions
of software. A survey of these actions highlighted that, asides
from permanently disabling or breaking a handset, the top ten
concerns from users related to actions which would cost the
user money (such as making premium rate calls or sending
premium rate SMS messages), or were destructive (such as
deleting user data like contacts) [18]. Other concerns raised
included the public sharing of data which users felt was con-
fidential, such as their text messages, emails, or photographs.
Users were also concerned about the sharing of their data with
advertisers, or the abuse of their contacts for spamming, and
the risk of theft of passwords or other credentials such as credit
card details.
In a survey of perceived value and sensitivity of their data,
the sensitivity of location data and passwords was highlighted,
as well as that of other types of data, such as photos and
videos, or of messages [19]. It is therefore clear that users are
concerned both about the theft of their data, and of the risk of
the loss of such data, and the consequence of its loss.
A. Lockscreen Bypass
The first attack we identified allows an unauthenticated
attacker to bypass the device’s lockscreen, if the user made
use of a PIN, password or pattern lock for security. Since the
lockscreen on Android is designed to fail insecure, in the event
of corrupted (or missing) settings, simply removing the pattern
or PIN data is sufficient to completely bypass the lockscreen.
By removing the file /data/system/password.key, or
/data/system/gesture.key, for PIN/password or pat-
tern locks respectively, the lockscreen security was completely
removed. Alternatively, the cryptographic hash of the password
may be obtained from this file, and brute-forced, as described
in [20, p. 268–275], in order to establish the plaintext pass-
word, PIN, or pattern lock, as set by the user.
This attack is possible, since the device exposes an unau-
thenticated ADB shell by default, with privilege escalation to
root available through use of the su command. In the event
that ADB is disabled on the device, it may also be carried
out directly from the root ADB shell available through the
bootloader. Finally, a firmware update ZIP file could be crafted
(and signed) to remove this file via recovery, thus removing
lockscreen security, and providing the user with full access to
the device as though a password had been entered.
The ability to bypass the lockscreen poses a clear privacy
risk to users, as it serves as an authentication bypass to carry
out operations such as accessing user data, sending messages,
and similar. It also allows access to messages and potentially
sensitive files, including (for example), one-time passwords
sent over SMS to the device. The ability to bypass the
lockscreen therefore aids an attacker in carrying out interactive
exploration of the device.
B. Theft of User Data
With ADB access available to the device by default, the
adb pull command may be used to extract files from the
shared storage area of the device, or the SD card. These areas
of storage are not protected by per-application filesystem per-
missions, and are designed for the storage of data which a user
may wish to transfer to a computer. The adb pull command
does not require root access to succeed, and may be carried
out either from within the regular operating system, or from
the bootloader. In addition, due to the lack of authentication
on ADB connection attempts, it is also possible to use ADB
from the lockscreen to access data.
This attack makes it possible for a malicious attacker to
extract all of a user’s photographs, or documents, from the
device. By expanding this attack to utilise root permissions
(through privilege escalation via the su command), it is
possible to further extend it to result in the theft of private
per-application user data. This may include passwords for user
accounts, as well as user messages, photographs, cryptographic
keys, and other sensitive data which should only be accessible
to a single application, such as tokens. If this were carried out
against a banking app, there is potential for sensitive user data
to be obtained, depending upon the design of the application
in question.
It was also possible to gain a full image of the device’s
data partition, using root access to recursively select all files
found on the user data partition, and store them in a single
compressed archive, which could easily be extracted from the
device over ADB.
C. Full Access to Device Partitions
With full read-write access to the device, including operat-
ing system partitions, it was possible to make modifications to
the installed operating system. This was achieved from within
the operating system itself, by re-mounting the system parti-
tion as root using the command mount -o remount,rw
/system. It was also possible to carry this out from the
bootloader shell, as well as through the installation of a
custom ZIP from the recovery environment. These changes
are persistent through a factory reset, increasing the severity
of this attack, since rectifying the modifications will be beyond
the abilities of most users, if they were able to detect the
modifications in the first place.
D. Installation of a Keylogger
A malicious attacker may wish to capture user credentials,
in order to gain access to user accounts, or financial credentials
such as card details. Alternatively, they may simply wish to
know what a user is writing on their device, especially if it
is used to carry out sensitive tasks. It was possible to install
a keylogger through a variety of methods on this device,
without the user being aware. Firstly, from a rooted shell, it
was possible to replace the default keyboard application on
the system partition (this change will persist between installs).
It was also possible to remotely socially engineer a user to
install an updated version of the keyboard application, using
the publicly known signing keys to create an apparent update to
the keyboard. This update could be distributed on the internet,
or indeed installed through the USB interface of the device
while charging. An updated version of an application could
be installed over ADB using the command adb install
-r filename.apk, or directly from the device filesystem
by downloading it to the shared storage, and selecting the
application from the file manager.
E. Deletion of Data
With root access to the device, it was possible to gain full
access to the filesystems, and to erase all user data. By carrying
out a backup prior to this process, and potentially encrypting
the backup, it would be possible for a malicious party to
ransom a user’s data, requiring them to make a payment to gain
access to it again. As one of the main concerns of users was the
deletion of their data, this may cause significant inconvenience
to users [18]. The ability to scale this attack to many devices,
through the use of communal charging areas [12], would
also make the ability to spread malicious software like this
particularly harmful.
F. SMS Interception
With root access to the device, it is possible for the device
operating system to be modified, such that SMS messages may
be intercepted or redirected. This could take place without the
user being notified or aware, and could be used to relay seem-
ingly secure one-time passwords, which are commonly sent
via SMS. This modification would be made in the messaging
app or system frameworks, and could be carried out either
using root access from a plugged-in device, or by socially
engineering a user to install a rogue “updated” version of the
messaging app, using the publicly known signing keys to sign
the application package.
G. Premium Rate Abuse
One of the main concerns identified in [18] was the risk
that rogue software could run up a bill by making premium
rate calls or text messages. With root-level access to Android
devices, it is possible to modify the dialer to make calls
when the device is not in use, or to modify the messaging
app to silently (without a record kept in the sent items)
subscribe the user to premium rate SMS services, and send
premium rate messages. While the Android operating system
contains software to warn the user before premium rate SMS
messages are sent, these warnings are easily removed or
bypassed on a rooted device, where the operating system
may be modified without user intervention or knowledge. A
financially motivated attacker with the ability to carry out this
attack on many devices,such as by creating a fake mobile
phone charging station, could potentially compromise a large
number of devices, and make significant quantities of money
by making use of premium rate network services on behalf
of unwitting users. To hinder discovery of such an attack,
the modification may be configured to only operate when the
device is charging, such that no abnormal power use would be
noticed by a user.
H. Random Number Generation Compromise
Another attack which we found to be possible was the ef-
fective “short-circuiting” of the kernel’s random number gener-
ation. This was made possible through the root access exposed
by the device. By renaming /dev/urandom, and creating a
new symbolic link towards /dev/zero using the command
ln -s /dev/zero /dev/urandom, all random number
generation using the kernel APIs was compromised, after
the depletion of the existing random pool by running cat
/dev/random. A long series of random numbers was gen-
erated, and found to return all-zeroes, as expected. The ability
for an attacker to do this allows for the compromise of security
of encrypted communications, since randomly generated keys
would be entirely predictable. Additionally, numbers expected
to be random (such as nonces or initialisation vectors), may be
re-used and predictable, potentially compromising the security
of the protocol. In particular, for elliptic-curve based signature
algorithms such as ECDSA, re-use of a nonce causes a
catastrophic failure resulting in the ability for the signing key
to be determined from 2 signatures using the same nonce [21,
p. 68–72]. There is therefore potential for significant harm,
if malicious software, or indeed a malicious attacker, were to
abuse root access in order to render ineffective random number
generation on the device. This may also expose a user to further
attacks, since private components generated for Diffie-Hellman
key exchange (as seen in TLS), would be predictable and
repeated, potentially resulting in the ability for interception of
HTTPS-based traffic. On a device where sensitive tasks, such
as mobile banking, were being carried out, it would then be
possible for a remote attacker with ability to observe network
traffic (such as over an insecure Wi-Fi network) to break an
HTTPS connection through knowledge of the compromised
output of the random number generator.
I. Physical Damage to Device
Finally, with root access, it would be possible for a
malicious attacker to abuse root access to render the device
inoperable, and useless, effectively depriving the user from
their computing device. By using the Unix dd command,
it is possible to carry out raw read and write operations to
block devices on the device. By overwriting the kernel image
and recovery image, the device would be beyond the repair
capabilities of most users, since there would be no standard
means through which to restore the firmware. As we noticed
the device bootloader was unsigned, it is likely that an attacker
could overwrite this with an empty partition, to permanently
prevent the device from working. While there may be no clear
or strong motive to cause physical damage to user devices,
the ability to carry out this attack is a concern — potentially
an unscrupulous retailer could try to drive more sales of
new devices by having an attacker abuse this access to cause
damage to devices. For a user reliant upon their mobile device
as their main means of accessing electronic services, this would
be potentially disruptive, and also cause them to lose data,
reducing their confidence and trust in the technology.
VI. POTENTIAL MITIGATIONS
While the fundamental vulnerabilities identified here can-
not necessarily be resolved easily by end-users, it is possible
to identify some potential countermeasures to take. Firstly,
users should disable ADB on the device, from the “Developer
options” menu. This setting is ordinarily disabled by default,
but was enabled on the device due to an engineering build of
firmware being shipped on the finished device. Secondly, users
should consider making use of a USB cable with the data
lines shorted together, to prevent the transfer of data across
the USB port when charging. Since the bootloader may be
attacked separately from the operating system, users should
ensure the device is always charged using this cable, and
that the device is kept in sight at all times while charging
(to prevent the cable being swapped). While there is no easy
way to prevent abuse of the publicly-known signing keys used
for the recovery image and platform applications, vigilance
against installing any third party software, and avoiding the
installation of any software would help to alleviate this. This
would be a considerable trade-off for users, however, to forego
the installation of software in order to avoid such attacks.
A technically confident user may attempt to remove the
su binary from the device by remounting the system as read-
write, as discussed previously, and using the command rm
/system/xbin/su, although this will not protect the device
from other attacks such as the abuse of known recovery ZIP
and platform application signing keys, or indeed the use of the
CVE-2015-3036 root exploit, as demonstrated in Section IV-F.
This procedure is also somewhat risky in that removing the
wrong file may result in the device being unbootable.
On future devices, it would be beneficial for over-the-air
firmware updates to be possible as well — on this device,
there was no facility inbuilt for network-based updates that we
could identify. Instead, there was a menu option inviting the
user to place a file named update.zip on the SD card, and
select a menu option to install it. In addition to the problem of
the signing key being known for these update files, making it
easy for a malicious party to distribute fake updates containing
malicious software, the manufacturer is unable to issue prompt
and regular security updates directly to devices, to address
issues identified.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have highlighted some major security
weaknesses in a recent, low-cost Android device, intended for
developing markets. We identified that insufficient measures
were in place to protect user data. We showed how a root shell
could be gained on the device, out of the box, through both
the device firmware and the bootloader. We also demonstrated
the device shipped with a kernel root vulnerability, and that
this is exploitable by any locally running software (such as
an app). We also showed how persistent modifications to the
firmware could be made, which would persist through factory
resets, allowing for highly pervasive malicious software to be
installed and target user data. Furthermore, we highlighted the
risks of the device using the default firmware signing keys, and
application signing keys, the private components of which are
publicly available. We demonstrated that SELinux mandatory
access control could easily be disabled by the root user.
The implications of vulnerabilities such as this are partic-
ularly significant for users of devices in the developing world,
often the recipients and buyers of such low-cost devices as
their main computing device. Merely plugging this device into
a public charging station would be sufficient for a malicious
party to gain full control over the device, extract all of a user’s
personal data, and install pervasive malicious software onto
the device. This software could act as a keylogger, record-
ing passwords and financial information, or could serve to
silently gather sensitive data (such as two-factor authentication
SMS messages) and forward them to the attacker. Malicious
software could also erase all of a user’s data, and demand
a ransom for its return, or even simply destroy the device.
We demonstrated these changes will persist through a factory
reset, and that they are not visible to the end user. As the
changes persist, it is not possible for a user to remove such
malicious changes without advanced technical knowledge, and
a known-clean firmware image to replace their device’s soft-
ware with. While we have presented some mitigations against
these attacks, these require the user to be highly vigilant, and
would not allow them to make use of many of the functions of
the device (such as installing applications), in order to defend
against some of these attacks.
With the rise in adoption of smartphones and tablets in
developing markets, the security and privacy of their users
should be considered a priority when developing their soft-
ware. Guidelines from the Android Compatibility Definition
documents should be followed to avoid known security weak-
nesses. Finally, low level device firmware should be audited
to ensure that bootloaders and other interfaces do not expose
low-level root access to a device by default, which would
undermine the security model of an otherwise-secure operating
system.
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